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Governing together in good and bad times: the fulfilment of election pledges in 
Ireland 
 
Robert Thomson and Rory Costello 
 
Abstract  
According to mandate theory, parties make pledges during election campaigns, and the 
parties that form governments after elections fulfil their pledges. We examine the extent 
to which the fulfilment of election pledges depends on the type of government that 
forms and the economic conditions governing parties face. We do this by examining the 
IXOILOPHQWRI,ULVKSDUWLHV¶HOHFWLon pledges over a period of more than 30 years, 1977-
2011. During the time period considered, the Irish electoral and party systems produced 
eleven governments of four distinct types: majority and minority coalitions as well as 
majority and minority single-party governments. The eleven governments that held 
office during this period also varied considerably from each other in duration and the 
economic conditions they faced. By examining variation in pledge fulfilment across 
these governments, are able to draw inferences about the effects of different types of 
government and economic conditions on pledge fulfilment. 
 
According mandate theory and the responsible party model, the fulfilment of election 
pledges by governing parties is central to democratic representation, providing a 
mechanism by which citizens can exercise control over public policy (APSA 1950; 
Downs 1957; Klingemann et al. 1994). In this account, parties offer competing policy 
SODWIRUPVWRYRWHUVDQGµthe party which attracts the most votes on this basis then forms 
the next government, but it is bound (both morally and by fears of retribution at the next 
election) to carry through the program on whiFKRQZKLFKLWKDVEHHQHOHFWHG¶ (Budge 
and Hofferbert 1990: 111). Mandate theory is closely associated with single-party 
governments, which implies the expectation that parties are more likely to fulfil their 
election pledges when they govern alone rather than in coalition (Klingemann et al. 
1994: 31). However, extent to which a party in coalition government is able to fulfil its 
election pledges depends on a number of factors, such as the level of agreement with 
other government parties and whether it controls key positions within the government. 
Moreover, in certain circumstances (such as minority government) the ability of single-
party governments to fulfil their election pledges may be severely constrained.  
 This paper contributes to a growing body of research on pledge fulfilment (e.g. 
Pomper and Lederman 1980; Rallings 1987; Royed 1996; Thomson 2001; Artés and 
Bustos 2008; Naurin 2011; 2014; Kostadinova 2013). It does so by examining Ireland, 
which is of particular interest from a comparative perspective, not least because of the 
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unique 34-year time period that our dataset covers, 1977-2011. The cases we examine 
enable us to study pledge fulfilment in four distinct types of governments within the 
same country context: single-party and coalition governments, both with and without 
legislative majorities. The eleven Irish governments that held office between 1977 and 
2011 also varied considerably from each other with respect to the economic conditions 
they faced, including the boom years of the Celtic tiger as well as the bust following the 
2008 financial crisis. By examining variation in pledge fulfilment across these eleven 
governments, we hold constant important features of the political culture, party system 
and electoral system that may account for some of the variation in pledge fulfilment in 
cross-national studies. 
 The next section gives a brief overview of the electoral and party systems of 
Ireland, as well as the eleven governments that held office during the time period 
considered. We then describe how we measure election pledges and their fulfilment. 
That section also reports the descriptive findings on the numbers of pledges and the 
percentages of those pledges that are fulfilled. The section after that turns to 
explanation, by outlining our expectations about the factors that influence the likelihood 
that pledges are fulfilled. We then proceed with the analyses and conclusions. 
  
Irish elections, parties and governments, 1977-2011 
 
Irish elections are conducted using the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system of 
proportional representation. This infrequently used system allows voters to choose 
candidates rather than parties in multi-seat constituencies. Voters rank the candidates in 
order of their preference, and a quota is calculated based on the number of votes cast 
divided by the number of seats in the constituency plus one. The consequences of this 
system include a high value placed on constituency work by elected representatives and 
the relatively large numbers of independent representatives, as well as coalition 
governments (Sinnott 2010).  
 We consider eight parties over the entire time period of the present study, 
although not all existed at the same time. These eight parties include all major parties 
according to a broad definition that includes all nationally organized parties that won at 
least two parliamentary seats. Six of these eight parties participated in government at 
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some time during the 1977-2011 time period examined here. The main contenders for 
government office are Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, the two largest parties, and the Labour 
Party, which is smaller. Either Fianna Fáil or Fine Gael has been in government 
throughout this period, but never together. Unlike the situation in most other European 
countries, these two main parties do not lie on opposite sides of the left-right divide. 
Their origins lie in differences over the national question in the early years after 
independence from the UK, rather than social or economic conflict, and both are 
essentially centre-right parties (Weeks 2010). The Irish Labour Party has always been 
much smaller than Social Democratic parties in other European countries; it typically 
receives 10 per cent of votes, with a particularly strong performance of 19 per cent of 
the votes in the 2011 election, after a major economic crisis. 
 In addition, three other parties have participated in government at various times. 
The Progressive Democrats (PDs) championed free market policies in Ireland. They 
held office as a junior coalition partner with Fianna Fáil in four governing periods 
considered here: 1989-92, 1997-2002, and 2002-07, and also joined the government that 
formed in 2007. After a decline in electoral support, the PDs began the process of 
disbanding in 2008, while its leader remained in government as an independent. The 
Democratic Left, which formed in 1992, held office together with Fine Gael and 
Labour, 1994-1997, before merging ZLWKWKH/DERXU3DUW\LQ7KH*UHHQ3DUW\¶V
1997, 2002 and 2007 manifestos are included in the present study. In 2007 the Greens 
participated in government office for the first time. Parties that were in opposition 
during the time period considered here are the Workers Party and Sinn Féin. The 
:RUNHUV3DUW\ZDVWKHSUHGHFHVVRUWRWKH'HPRFUDWLF/HIW6LQQ)pLQ¶VDQG
manifestos are included in the present study. Sinn Féin has traditionally focused on the 
unification of Ireland and it also has strong socialist leanings.  
 The time period from 1977 onwards is a reasonable starting point for the 
analysis of election pledges because the 1977 Irish parliamentary election was a 
watershed in the development of comprehensive party platforms. Although both Labour 
and Fine Gael had been publishing manifestos for decades, 1977 was the first time that 
)LDQQD)iLOLVVXHGRQH)LDQQD)iLO¶VFRQGXFWLQWKHHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQGLVSOD\HGD
higher level of professionalism than in previous elections (Farrell and Manning 1978: 
154). 
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 Table 1 summarizes the composition, duration and four types of governments 
examined in the present study. It is noteworthy that the three single-party governments 
included in our study are all Fianna Fáil governments. This means we cannot exclude 
the possibility that our findings with respect to the comparison of single-party and 
coalition governments are affected by the characteristics of this particular party. We 
therefore conduct an additional comparison of pledges made by Fianna Fáil when it 
entered single-party governments and coalition governments to examine whether this 
affects our findings. Moreover, not all minority governments are the same. Two of the 
four minority governments - Fianna Fáil 1982 and Fianna Fáil/PDs in 1997 ± concluded 
agreements with independent parliamentarians, while the others did not. Again, we 
conduct an additional robustness test to examine whether this affects our findings. As 
noted above, the Irish system has a relatively high proportion of independent 
FDQGLGDWHV :H GR QRW H[DPLQH WKH IXOILOPHQW RI LQGHSHQGHQWV¶ HOHFWLRQ SOHGJHV
because they do not issue election manifestos that are comparable to those of national 




 Irish governments faced radically different economic conditions during the 
period examined here. Governments in the early 1980s managed an economy with 
sluggish growth and strained public sector finances. By contrast, governments in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s had managed a booming economy. Average economic 
growth reached its peak in the 1997-02 governing period at an average of 9.2 per cent 
each year. The 2007-11 period contains one of the most dramatic economic crises 
expeULHQFHG E\ D :HVWHUQ JRYHUQPHQW LQ UHFHQW GHFDGHV ,W UHYHDOHG WKDW ,UHODQG¶V
previous growth had coincided with an unsustainable property bubble and imprudent 
lending practices. The government initiated a massive bailout of Irish banks in 2008, 
amidst rising unemployment and soaring costs of government borrowing in 
international bond markets. This led to an international troika of the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund granting 
a bailout to the Irish exchequer in 2010 (Murphy 2011). Many observers concluded that 
the Irish government was effectively no longer in charge of running the country. The 
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sitting coalition of Fianna Fáil and the Green Party fell, and both governing parties were 
punished severely by voters in February 2011, after which a new coalition consisting of 
Fine Gael and the Labour Party took office. 
 
Identifying election pledges and measuring fulfilment 
 
0RVW RI WKH HOHFWLRQ SOHGJHV H[DPLQHG KHUH DUH VRXUFHG IURP SDUWLHV¶ PDQLIHVWRV
Although few voters actually read manifestos in detail, these documents contain the 
most definitive statements of the policies forwarded by parties during the campaign. 
There are two exceptions to this focus on manifestos where one of the parties did not 
publish a manifesto. The first exception is Fine Gael; it did not publish a manifesto in 
the February 1982 election. Instead, it fought the campaign on the basis of its recently 
GHIHDWHGEXGJHW)LQH*DHO¶VSROLF\LQWHQWLRQVZHUHVHWRXWLQDVSHHFKJLYHQLQGHIHQFH
of that budget by the then Prime Minister (Taoiseach), Garret FitzGerald, to Galway 
Chamber of Commerce. This speech is used in place of a party manifesto. The second 
exception is that Fianna Fáil did not produce a manifesto for the November 1982 
election. Here, the party leader wrote an article in the Irish Times just before the 
election, which other researchers have used as a substitute for the manifesto (for 
example in the Comparative Manifestos Project). However, this speech did not contain 
any testable pledges and so we exclude it from the analysis. 
 We include the election manifestos or equivalent documents published by all of 
the major parties prior to the election, regardless of whether they went on to participate 
in government after the election. There are two reasons for including the manifestos of 
opposition parties in the study. First, elections are supposed to be about choices 
between alternatives. We need to include the manifestos of all parties to identify the 
nature and extent of those choices. Second, mandate theory refers to a particular pattern 
RIFRQJUXHQFHEHWZHHQSDUWLHV¶HOHFWLRQSURJUDPPHVDQGJRYHUQPHQWSROLFLHVWKHOHYHO
of congruence should be higher for governing than opposition parties. Perhaps 
surprisingly, election pledges made by parties that do not enter government after 
elections may be fulfilled. Although they do not hold power, opposition parties may 
also respond to the same underlying determinants of public policies, their pledges may 
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agree with pledges made by parties that entered government, and governing parties may 
take popular proposals from the opposition. 
 We consider a statement to be a pledge if it contains µunequivocal support for a 
specific action or outcome that is testable¶. This definition follows the definition 
proposed by Royed (1996). In line with Thomson (2001), we add that for a statement to 
be a pledge, it must identify the µcriteria on the basis of which we can examine whether 
the pledge is fXOILOOHG¶5HJDUGLQJWKHVWUHQJWKRIµXQHTXLYRFDOFRPPLWPHQW¶UHTXired, 
ZHLQFOXGHµVRIW¶FRPPLWPHQWVVXFKDVµZHVXSSRUW¶RUµZHZLOOVWULYHWRZDUG¶DVZHOO
DVµKDUG¶ commLWPHQWVVXFKDVµZHZLOO¶RUµZHSURPLVHWR¶.  
 With respect to the amount of detail required on the action or outcome, our 
definition of an election pledge requires that parties specify the criteria on the basis of 
which we can assess fulfilment. It is not enough for a party to refer to a policy problem 
and say it will do something about this SUREOHP6RWKHVWDWHPHQWWKDWµwe will actively 
support the development of industry-EDVHGUHVHDUFKFDSDFLW\¶ (found in the Fianna Fáil 
manifesto of 2002) does not meet our definition. We argue that there are many different 
ways of increasing industry-based research capacity, including tax breaks for research 
and development in the private sector, subsidies for collaboration between universities 
and industry, as well as direct public funding of innovation in companies. Our choice of 
specific and directly testable statements is appropriate in the Irish context because 
parties are quite detailed when setting out their policy intentions, as will become clear in 
the next section.  
 Each manifesto was coded by a researcher who is familiar with the Irish political 
context. The researcher went through the manifesto line by line, marking the statements 
that met the definition of an election pledge. Similar pledges, or pledges that elaborated 
on a previous pledge (e.g. a pledge to reduce the basic rate of taxation followed by a 
pledge to reduce the basic rate of taxation to a specific percentage) were combined and 
counted as single pledges. As part of a series of reliability tests, seven researchers 
independently coded portions of a manifesto using this definition of election pledges. 
Each coder identified approximately 65 election pledges. The average paired reliability 
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for the exercise was 76 per cent, with a range of 64 to 86 per cent (insert author 
reference).1 
Irish parties make considerable numbers of election pledges. On average, each 
manifesto or equivalent includes 72.9 pledges (n=45)2. Fianna Fáil, however, made only 
two pledges in February 1982 manifesto, and none in the newspaper article that other 
researchers have used as a substitute for its November 1982 manifesto. By contrast, 
)LDQQD )iLO¶V  PDQLIHVWR FRQWDined the largest numbers of pledges. The most 
common type of pledge consists of pledges to expand particular programmes or make 
changes that would imply increases in government spending. For example, Fianna Fáil 
promised to end hospital waiting lists, reduce class sizes in schools, and increase the 
numbers of policy officers. Most pledges are not directly related to pledges made by 
other parties. Those that are tend to be similar. On a small number of key issues, 
manifestos provide clear alternatives. These involve pledges that if fulfilled, would 
mean by definition that pledges of other parties were unfulfilled. For example, in 2002 
Fine Gael and Labour pledged to freeze income tax rates. The Progressive Democrats, 
by contrast, pledged to reduce the top rate from 42 to 40 per cent. 
The sources consulted to assess the fulfilment of each pledge depended on the 
content of the pledge. The relevant criteria for assessing pledge fulfilment are identified 
in the pledges themselves, since we define a pledge as unequivocal support for a 
particular action or outcome, specified in enough detail to enable researchers to test 
whether or not the action or outcome was realized. The pledges led the researchers to 
examine a range of relevant legislation, ministerial decisions, spending allocations, 
parliamentary records and official reports. The Legislation Directory of the Irish Statute 
Book was a useful source for searching for changes to Irish law in line with election 
pledges.  
Each pledge was categorised as fully fulfilled, partly fulfilled or not fulfilled. 
)RU H[DPSOH ZH MXGJHG DV IXOO\ IXOILOOHG )LDQQD )iLO¶V  SOHGJH WR HVWDEOLVK D
WUDLQLQJIXQGRIXSWR¼SHUSHUVRQIRUXQHPSOR\HGSHRSOHIDFLQJVHULRXVEDUULHUV
to employment. The High Support Process was introduced by the National Training and 
                                                 
1 The analysis integrates data from two previous studies (Mansergh 2004; Costello and 
Thomson 2008). The data from the 2002 manifestos include socioeconomic pledges only, which 
make up approximately half of all pledges made. There is no significant difference between the 
rates of fulfilment of socioeconomic pledges and other pledges. 
2 Excludes pledges from 2002. 
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Employment Authority (FÁS), in 2003. This measure is designed to assist FÁS 
Employment Officers to better meet the needs of clients who, because of health, literacy 
or other difficulties experience major barriers to finding employment. In 2006, a total of 
¼SHUSHUVRQZDVDYDLODEOHXQGHUWKLVVFKHPHWRUHVRXUFHWKHUHOHYDQWLQWHUYHQWLRQV
such as counselling and supplemental training.3 7KH 3URJUHVVLYH 'HPRFUDWV¶ 
pledge to reduce the top rate of income tax from 42 to 40 per cent was only partly 
fulfilled because the top rate had been reduced to 41 per cent by 2007. Our tests reveal a 
high level of inter-coder reliability for this method. A total of 40 pledges were randomly 
selected and examined by seven researchers. For each pledge, one of the researchers 
provided the other researchers with the evidence he or she used to evaluate the 
fulfilment of each pledge without revealing his or her evaluation. Each of the seven 
researchers then independently categorizes each pOHGJH DV µIXOO\¶ µpartly¶, or µnot¶ 
fulfilled. On all 40 cases, the majority of the seven researchers agreed on the same 
coding. On 27 of the 40 pledges, all seven researchers agreed on the same 
categorization; on eight of the 40 pledges, six researchers agreed; on five pledges, four 
researchers agreed; and on one pledge four researchers agreed. Across the 40 pledges, 
we found an average agreement rate of 93 per cent (insert author reference). 
Figure 1 summarizes the variation in pledge fulfilment. Over the entire time 
period, pledges made by parties that entered government office after the elections, 
which we will refer to as µgoverning parties¶ regardless of whether they were in office 
before the elections, have a higher rate of pledge fulfilment than pledges made by 
parties that entered the opposition. Of the 1,783, 801 (44.9 per cent) were at least partly 
fulfilled and 574 (32.2 per cent) fully fulfilled. Of the 1,898 pledges made by opposition 
parties over the entire time period, 729 (38.4 per cent) were at least partly fulfilled and 
464 (24.5 per cent) fully fulfilled. The difference between governing and opposition 
SDUWLHV¶ SOHGJH IXOILOPHQW DOWKRXJK QRW ODUJH LV VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW &KL-2 16.07, 
p=.00). While these aggregate descriptive figures are informative, they are of limited 
use in disentangling the various factors that influence the likelihood of pledge 
fulfilment. In the following sections we set out our expectations and test these with a 
multivariate method. 
 
                                                 
3 FÁS Annual Report 2003; Dáil Debates 623: 1596, 6 July 2006. 
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The main assumption behind our expectations is that election pledges are more likely to 
be fulfilled when the parties that made them hold more governmental power after the 
elections and when pledges are more responsive to the determinants of public policy. If 
a governing party is compelled to share power, either with coalition partners or with 
opposition parties, we expect to observe lower rates of pledge fulfilment than in single-
party governments with secure majorities. Coalition government compels governing 
parties to moderate their policy demands, either by dropping their demands in particular 
policy areas in return for control over other policy areas, or by agreeing to compromise 
outcomes that differ from their election pledges. Governing parties that do not control 
secure parliamentary majorities may face similar pressures to parties in coalition 
governments. Policy concessions to one or more opposition parties may be required in 
exchange for their informal support to get bills passed. The inclusion of opposition 
SDUWLHV¶ SOHGJHV LQ RXU DQDO\VLV SURYLGHV DQ LPSRUWDQW EHQFKPDUN DJDLQVW ZKLFK WR
assess the performance of different types of governments in terms of pledge fulfilment. 
The fact that SDUWLHV¶HOHFWLRQSOHGJHVDUHUDUHO\LQGLUHFWGLVDJUHHPent with one 
another may ameliorate the negative effect of coalition government on pledge 
fulfilment. This feature of party competition, in which parties talk past each other, is 
one of the main propositions of the saliency theory of party competition that highlights 
WKHLPSRUWDQFHRISDUWLHV¶RZQHUVKLSRIGLIIHUHQWLVVXHV5REHUWVRQ%XGJHHWDO
1987). Nonetheless, even pledges that focus on different aspects of policy and are not in 
direct disagreement draw on the same pool of government resources, both in terms of 
public sector finances and policy attention, and therefore compete with each other 
indirectly.  
In contrast to the low level of disagreement, the level of direct agreement among 
parties is often relatively high. For example, Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats 
formed a coalition in 2002 on the basis of election manifestos in which approximately 
30 per cent of pledges made by each party were in agreement, while only 2 per cent 
were in direct disagreement. We expect that pledges made by parties in coalition 
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government are more likely to be fulfilled when there is consensus among coalition 
parties. Furthermore, we expect explicit consensus among parties to increase the 
likelihood of pledge fulfilment, even when it is consensus among government and 
opposition or among opposition parties. Agreement among parties indicates that the 
policies are widely supported and are therefore more likely to be implemented by the 
government. 
 Within coalitions, negotiations between governing parties are relevant. Several 
models of coalition formation highlight the importance of proposal power in the 
formation process in shaping government policy. Coalition formation is modelled as a 
sequential bargaining process, beginning when a party is selected to make a proposal to 
form a government and ending when a proposal is accepted by a majority of legislators 
(Baron 1991; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; see Laver 
et al 2011 for a criticism of this approach).  These models predict that government 
policy will be skewed heavily towards the position of the proposer, which is generally 
the largest party. However, some policy concessions must be offered to the junior 
coalition partner or partners, to make the offer more attractive than the reversion point 
(i.e. the position of a caretaker government).  While there is limited empirical evidence 
in support of a formateur advantage in terms of the most visible outcome of 
negotiations, portfolio allocation (see Laver et al 2011: 288), such an advantage might 
appear in terms of the policy agreed by the coalition.  In the Irish context, there is no 
formal formatuer party, but conventionally the initiative in government formation goes 
to the largest party.   
Other models of coalition politics also attribute considerable power to the largest 
party in the coalition. For Huber (1996), the vote of confidence procedure is an 
important institution. This procedure enables the prime minister to raise the stakes in 
any vote in parliament by making it a vote of confidence in the government. This 
severely limits the extent to which junior coalition parties can shape policy outcomes. If 
a junior party proposed a policy that the senior party disagreed with, the prime minister 
could reject the proposal in the knowledge that the junior coalition partner will 
ultimately toe the line in a vote of confidence on the issue, or face an early election. In 
addition to its power to hold a vote of confidence, recently developed models show how 
WKHSULPHPLQLVWHU¶VSDUW\FDQVKDSH policy outcomes by reconfiguring the jurisdictions 
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of ministerial portfolios (e.g. Thies 2001; Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011). Qualitative 
studies also show how the prime ministership plays a vital role in coordinating the 
overall direction of policy and setting priorities in modern cabinet governance, and 
Ireland is often considered to be a country where the power of the prime minister is high 
in comparative terms (King 1994 2¶/HDU\ ). These arguments imply that the 
largest party in a coalition, which in the cases we examine is also always the party of 
the prime minister, has an advantage in policy formulation and policymaking, and we 
expect this to give them an advantage in pledge fulfilment.  
 An alternative view is that government policy in a coalition is not the result of 
negotiation and compromise between the parties, but rather each party pursues its own 
agenda in the ministries it controls. In their model of coalition governance, Laver and 
Shepsle (1994; 1996) argue that policymaking in modern states is structured by the 
division of policy areas into ministerial jurisdictions, whereby parties have little say in 
policy areas over which they do not receive ministerial control. According to this 
model, parties will be persuaded to participate in a coalition only if they believe it to be 
credible in terms of policy. The distribution of ministerial portfolios provides such 
credibility.4 In addition, models of ministerial drift posit that ministers may be tempted 
to push initiatives that differ from theLU JRYHUQPHQW¶V FRPPRQ SODWIRUP SRVVLEO\
inflicting costs on some cabinet colleagues and their constituencies (Huber and Shipan 
2002: 185; Martin and Vanberg 2004: 15-6). Norms of ministerial responsibility and 
non-LQWHUIHUHQFH LQ RWKHU PLQLVWHUV¶ SRUWIROios, as well as information asymmetries, 
discourage other cabinet ministers from detecting this ministerial drift. Following these 
arguments, we expect that pledges are more likely to be fulfilled if the party that made 
them went on to hold the relevant ministerial portfolio. 
 Pledges are more likely to be redeemed when governments have more resources 
at their disposal, both in terms of material resources and time. In times of economic 
growth, public finances are under less pressure. Comparative public policy research 
demonstrates that economic conditions and development are among the most important 
explanations of variation in policy outputs in addition to the partisan composition of 
                                                 
4 /DYHUDQG6KHSVOH¶VPRGHO also refers specifically to the government agreement between the 
coalition partners. We do not include a separate variable in the analyses for the coalition 
agreement since there is reason to believe this is endogenous to some of our key explanatory 
variables, notably the allocation of ministerial portfolios and agreement among parties.  
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government (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2001). Previous research found that election 
pledges are concentrated on electorally salient policy areas such as taxation, health care, 
education and policing. These are policy areas that effect government revenue and 
expenditure and are consequently likely to be affected by the general economic 
situation. We therefore expect that economic growth will increase the likelihood of 
fulfilment, particularly for pledges that directly affect public finances, such as pledges 
to expand policy programmes or to cut taxes. In addition, when governments are short 
in duration, as is the case with several of the governing periods we examine, we 
anticipate lower levels of pledge fulfilment. 
 The causes of variation in levels of pledge fulfilment differ for governing and 
opposition parties. Obviously opposition parties do not vary in the extent of their 
control over governmental power. However, they do vary in terms of the types of 
JRYHUQPHQWV WKH\ IDFH DQG ZH H[SORUH ZKHWKHU RSSRVLWLRQ SDUWLHV¶ SOHGJHV DUH PRUH
likely to be fulfilled when they face minority compared to majority governments or 
coalitions compared single-SDUW\ JRYHUQPHQWV 2SSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHVGRYDU\ LQ
the extent to which their pledges respond to and are aligned with the determinants of 
government policies. We examine whether opposition pledges that are in agreement 
with those made by governing parties are more likely to be fulfilled, and whether 
opposition pledges that require public expenditure ± to expand programmes and cut 
taxes ± are more likely to be fulfilled when economic conditions are favourable. Such 
expansionary and tax-cut pledges are likely to be popular ones and governing parties are 





We apply logistic regression models to examine the factors that affect the likelihood of 
pledge fulfilment. The dependent variable in each of these analyses is a dichotomous 
measure indicating whether the pledge is at least partly fulfilled (1) or not fulfilled (0).5 
                                                 
5 We also applied multinomial models with a three-category dependent variable. The results 
were substantively the same, but we prefer the logistic regression since the results are more 
readily interpretable. Moreover, the reliability of the two-category measure of fulfilment 
variable was found to be somewhat higher than the three-category measure. 
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As the factors affecting pledge fulfilment differ for governing and opposition parties, 
we examine these two groups of pledges separately. We begin by focusing on the 
factors affecting fulfilment of JRYHUQLQJ SDUWLHV¶ SOHGJHV 7DEOH . As some of our 
expectations relate specifically to pledges made by parties in coalition government, we 
present two logistic regression models in Table 2. Model 1 includes all 1,783 pledges 
made by governing parties; while Model 2 restricts the analysis to the 1,651 pledges 




The first two variables in Model 1 refer to the effect of power sharing and 
agreement between coalition parties. The variables µCoalition (with consensus)¶ and 
µSingle-party government¶ are part of a three-category independent variable. The 
reference group in this three-FDWHJRU\YDULDEOHFRQVLVWVRIJRYHUQLQJFRDOLWLRQSDUWLHV¶
pledges that are not in direct agreement with pledges of their coalition partners. The 
coefficients for these variables tell us that pledges made by single party governments 
and by coalition governments where there is a degree of consensus among the coalition 
partners are significantly more likely to be fulfilled than pledges made by coalition 
parties without support from their governing partners. The finding regarding coalition 
party pledges does not take into account whether the party that made the pledge is a 
senior or junior member of the coalition, an issue to which we return below. It is 
noteworthy that the effect of µCoalition (with consensus)¶ is greater than the effect of 
µSingle-party government¶, but the difference in the size of the coefficients is not 
significant. Recall that all of the single-party governments were Fianna Fáil 
governments. If we include only the 705 pledges made by Fianna Fáil before it entered 
government, the coefficient for µSingle-party government¶ becomes insignificant. This 
is because Fianna Fáil was always the largest party and held the prime ministership 
when it participated in coalitions.  
The next variable indicates whether the party was in a majority or a minority 
government. The coefficient for this variable is not statistically significant. So there is 
no evidence that majority governments are on the whole better able to fulfil their 
election pledges than parties in minority governments. We also explored whether a 
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combination of majority status and coalition status influenced pledge fulfilment, by 
including an interaction between these variables. However, the interaction was not 
significant, and we do not report the results here. We noted above that minority 
governments differ with respect to whether they had made deals with independent 
parliamentarians, but this does not affect our results. We created a dummy variable for 
the two governments that did not conclude agreements with independents (the Fine 
Gael/Labour coalition formed in 1981 and the single-party Fianna Fáil government 
formed in 1987). When added to Model 1, this dummy variable has a negative sign as 
expected, but is insignificant (-.40; s.e. .51; p=.43), while the coefficient for majority 
status remains insignificant.  
 Model 2 restricts the analysis to pledges made by parties that entered coalitions 
after the elections. It also allows us to examine whether the status of a party within the 
coalition matters for pledge fulfilment. As anticipated, pledges made by parties that 
hold the prime ministership are significantly more likely to be fulfilled than those made 
by a junior coalition partner.  However, the results do not support the expectation that 
pledges are more likely to be fulfilled when the party held the relevant ministry.   
 Figure 2 shows the estimated probability of pledge fulfilment depending on the 
status of the party within the government and the relationship between government 
party pledges. The estimates are based on the results in Models 1 and 2, holding other 
variables in the model at their mean (for continuous variables) or mode (for 
dichotomous variables). Figure 2 also includes a comparable estimate for opposition 
party pledges that are not supported by government parties (based on results in Table 3). 
According to these estimates, pledges made by parties that govern alone have a similar 
FKDQFHRIEHLQJDWOHDVWSDUWO\IXOILOOHGDVSOHGJHVPDGHE\WKHSULPHPLQLVWHU¶VSDUWy in 
a coalition government where there is no consensus with other coalition parties. Thus, 
while the results from Model 1 tell us that pledges made by single-party governments 
are more likely to be fulfilled than pledges made by coalition parties, this is not the case 
when we compare only parties holding the prime-ministership.6 This is an important 
finding, as it implies that the type of government that forms (coalition or single-party) 
does not affect the ability of the senior government party to implement its pledges. In 
                                                 
6 The non-significant effect of coalition government is confirmed by running a model which 
includes only pledges made by parties holding the prime-ministership. 
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comparison, pledges made by junior government parties are less likely to be fulfilled 
than pledges made by senior government parties. Figure 2 also highlights the 
importance of consensus among governing coalition parties. A pledge made by a senior 
coalition party (i.e. the party of the prime minister) that is supported by a junior 





 The results in Table 2 also show that agreement with opposition parties matters. 
:KHQDJRYHUQLQJSDUW\¶VSOHGJHLVVLPLODUWRDSOHGJHPDGHE\DQRSSRVLWLRQSDUW\WKH
likelihood of fulfilment increases significantly. The magnitude of this effect is similar to 
that of agreement between coalition parties.  
 The next set of variables in Model 1 relate to the effect of economic growth on 
WKHIXOILOPHQWRIGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRISOHGJHV7KHFRHIILFLHQWIRUWKHYDULDEOHµ*URZWK¶LV
positive and significant, implying that economic growth increases the likelihood of 
fulfilment for pledges that do not relate to expansionary public policies or tax cuts. The 
effect of growth is not significantly stronger for expansionary pledges, as shown by the 
coefficient for the interaction between growth and expansionary pledges. However, we 
do find that the effect of growth is significantly stronger for tax cut pledges. The effect 
of economic growth on the likelihood of pledge fulfilment can be best illustrated 
graphically. The governments examined here experienced very different levels of 
economic growth, ranging from an average within the government periods of -1.3 per 
cent to 9.1 per cent)LJXUHGHSLFWVWKHSUREDELOLW\RIIXOILOPHQWRIJRYHUQLQJSDUWLHV¶
pledges at different levels of economic growth, while other variables in the model are 
held constant at their mode value.7 For non-expansionary, non-tax cut pledges (labelled 
µother pledges¶ in Figure 3), the effect of economic growth is relatively modest. At the 
lowest level of economic growth, -1.3 per cent, the probability that a pledge is at least 
partly fulfilled is .27; this increases to .47 at the highest level of economic growth of 9.1 
per cent. Expansionary pledges are more likely to be fulfilled at all levels of growth, but 
                                                 
7 Holding other variables at their mode means that Figure 3 depicts estimated effect of 
fulfilment for pledges made by parties in majority coalition governments that last more than two 
years, where there is no consensus with other coalition parties or with opposition parties. 
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growth does not have a significantly stronger effect on the fulfilment of these pledges 
than it does for other pledges. The most striking finding is in relation to pledges to cut 
taxes. At low levels of growth, pledges to cut taxes are less likely to be fulfilled than 
other pledges (the probability of fulfilment is only .17). However, at the highest levels 
of growth, tax-cut pledges are much more likely to be fulfilled than other pledges (with 




Another resource ± time ± is also relevant to pledge fulfilment. Pledges made by 
governing parties are significantly less likely to be fulfilled if the government is short-
lived. A typical pledge made by a party that goes on to form a short-lived single-party 
government of less than one yeas has a probability of being at least partly fulfilled of 
only .11, compared to .36 for pledges made by single party governments that last longer 
than one year.8  
 Our multivariate analyses did not include variables that identified pledges to 
maintain the status quo or pledges to bring about a certain outcome as opposed to taking 
a certain action that is in principle within the control of government. The reason for 
omitting these variables is that we have relatively few observations of them. Status quo 
and outcome pledges each account for less than 2 per cent of our observations. 
Although the numbers of cases prevent us from examining the effects in our 
multivariate analyses, we would expect that status quo pledges are more likely to be 
fulfilled. Indeed, of the 30 status quo pledges made by governing parties, 26 (87 per 
cent) were at least partly fulfilled, compared to 44 per cent of other types of pledges 
made by parties that went on to govern. We might also have expected that outcome 
pledges would be harder to fulfil. However, of the 21 outcome pledges, 16 were at least 
partly fulfilled. Given the small numbers of observations, we attach little importance to 
this particular finding. The results of the models presented in Tables 2 and 3 are the 
same if we exclude these pledges from the analysis. 
                                                 
8 These predicted probabilities were calculated based on Model 1, holding other explanatory 
variables constant at their means (for continuous variables) or medians (for dichotomous 
variables). As a robustness test, we also applied models with an additional control for 
governments that lasted longer than one year, but shorter than three years. This additional 
variable was insignificant in all of the models. 
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 :HQRZWXUQWRWKHIXOILOPHQWRIRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHV in Table 3. In line 
ZLWKH[SHFWDWLRQVRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHVDUHDIIHFWHGPDLQO\E\WKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK
they respond to or are congruent with the factors that affect public policies. There is no 
HYLGHQFH WKDW WKH IXOILOPHQW RI RSSRVLWLRQ SDUWLHV¶ SOHGJHV LV DIIHFWHG E\ WKH W\SH RI
government they face. By contrast, economic growth has a strong effect on the 
likelihood of fulfilment for opposition parties¶SOHGJHV. The effect of economic growth 
is significantly stronger for both expansionary and tax-cut pledges. Support for 
RSSRVLWLRQ SDUWLHV¶ SOHGJHV E\ RWKHU SDUWLHV SDUWLFXODUO\ E\ JRYHUQLQJ SDUWLHV KDV D
VWURQJSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRQWKHIXOILOPHQWRIRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHV7KLVLQdicates that 
PDQ\ RI WKH RSSRVLWLRQ SDUWLHV¶ SOHGJHV WKDW DUH IXOILOOHG DUH VLPLODU WR JRYHUQLQJ
parties¶ pledges. A notable GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ JRYHUQLQJ DQG RSSRVLWLRQ SDUWLHV¶
pledges is that short governments are associated with significantly lower levels of 
pledge fulfilment for governing parties, but not for opposition parties. This might 
VXJJHVW WKDW WKH RSSRVLWLRQ SDUWLHV¶ SOHGJHV WKDW DUH IXOILOOHG DUH RQHV WKDW DUH






The main objective of this study was to test whether pledge fulfilment depends on the 
type of government that forms after the election. The Irish cases allowed us to compare 
pledge fulfilment in different kinds of governments: coalitions and single-party 
governments, both with and without parliamentary majorities. In line with the principle 
of the party mandate, pledges made by parties that entered government office were 
more likely to be fulfilled than pledges made by parties that entered the opposition after 
WKHHOHFWLRQV+RZHYHUWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQJRYHUQLQJDQGRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV¶UDWHV
of pledge fulfilment was not always large.  
We find that the advantage of holding office depends on the SDUW\¶VSRVLWLRQLQ
government more than the type of government that forms. We found no significant 
difference between rates of pledge fulfilment for governing parties with and without 
secure parliamentary majorities. The strength of minority governments accords with 
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previous research on minority governments in Spain, Sweden and elsewhere, which 
demonstrates that minority governments find ways of fulfilling their election pledges 
and bringing about policy change (Artés and Bustos 2008; Naurin 2011; Strøm 1990). 
One of the ways in which minority governments manage to change policies is to make 
concessions to opposition parties. For instance, a substantial proportion of the 
&DWDORQLDQ 1DWLRQDOLVW 3DUW\¶V &L8 SOHGJHV ZHUH IXOILOOHG LQ UHWXUQ IRU VXSSRUWLQJ
minority Spanish governments in the 1990s (Artés and Bustos 2008). We do not find 
HYLGHQFHWKDWRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV¶SOHGJHVZHUHVLJQLILFDQWO\PRUHOLNHO\WREHIXOILOOHGLI
they faced minority governments, as in the cases we examine minority governments did 
not enter into arrangements with opposition parties in return for their support.  
 In line with previous research, pledges made by parties that govern alone are 
more likely to be fulfilled than pledges made by parties that are in coalition government 
(Mansergh and Thomson 2007). However, when we restrict the comparison to parties 
holding the prime-ministership, we find no significant difference for single-party or 
coalition governments. This finding challenges the commonly held view that single-
party governments are more conducive to strong programme-to-policy linkages. For the 
party of the prime minister, a relatively strong link is found to exist between election 
pledges and subsequent government policy regardless of what type of government 
forms.  In contrast, smaller parties in coalition governments, which are assumed to be in 
a weaker bargaining position in many models of coalition government, were found to be 
less successful in fulfilling their pledges.  
In coalition governments, the fulfilment of election pledges is likely when the 
governing parties agree. When coalitions form among parties that are close to each 
other in policy terms, not only is their electoral mandate clearer (in terms of voters 
endorsing a particular set of policies), but it is also more likely to be enacted. Indeed, 
we find that pledges on which prospective coalition partners agree are even more likely 
to be fulfilled than pledges made by parties that go on to govern alone.  
 /LMSKDUW¶V  IDPRXV FRQVHQVXV PRGHO KDV EHHQ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK HIIHFWLYH
performance in several respects. Ireland has an intermediate position on the executive-
SDUWLHV¶ GLPHQVLRQ RI FRQVHQVXV GHPRFUDF\ LELG  UHIOHFWLQJ LWV FRPELQDWLRQ RI
consensual and majoritarian characteristics. We show that when Irish governments are 
consensual, whereby they are coalitions of parties that agree with each other, they 
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perform at least as well as single-party governments in terms of pledge fulfilment. This 
key finding is also relevant to other ways of describing differences among democracies. 
McGann and Latner (2013) argue that policies can be changed more easily in systems of 
PR-majority rule, of which most of the Irish coalitions are examples, than by single-
party governments. 
 We found a strong effect of the prevailing economic conditions on pledge 
fulfilment. All pledges are more likely to be fulfilled when there is strong economic 
growth and less likely to be fulfilled in times of economic decline. As expected, the 
effect of economic growth is particularly pronounced for pledges to cut taxes, which 
were less likely to be fulfilled than other pledges at low levels of growth and more 
likely to be fulfilled than other pledges at high levels of growth. One interpretation of 
this finding is that parties make election pledges that are overly optimistic, in that they 
can only be fulfilled under conditions of strong economic growth. Parties may believe 
that the short-term electoral reward of making attractive but unrealistic pledges 
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Figures and tables 
 
 
Figure 1. Pledge fulfilment in Ireland, 1977-2011.  
Note: Black bars refer to the percentages of fully-fulfilled pledges; grey bars to partly-fulfilled pledges. 
*VWDQGVIRUµJRYHUQLQJSDUWLHV¶2IRUµRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV¶)UHIHUVWRWKH)HEUXDU\HOHFWLRQ
and 1982N to the November 1982 election. The numbers refer to the total number of tested pledges made 










Probability of fulfilment for opposition parties estimated from the model in Table 3; for parties in single-
party governments from Model 1 in Table 2; and for parties in coalition governments from Model 2 in 
Table 2. Other explanatory variables held DWWKHLUPHDQVPRGHVµ&RDOLWLRQ¶LQGLFDWHVDSDUW\LQFRDOLWLRQ
JRYHUQPHQW µ-QU¶ LQGLFDWHVDFRDOLWLRQSDUW\ WKDWGLGQRWKROG WKHSULPHPLQLVWHUVKLS µ6QU¶ LQGLFDWHVD
FRDOLWLRQSDUW\WKDWKHOGWKHSULPHPLQLVWHUVKLSµ&RQVHQVXV¶LQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHSOHGJHZDVVXSSRUWHGE\







Estimated with Model 1 in Table 2, holding the values of other explanatory variables at their modes. 
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Minority 82: Fianna Fáil (9 months) 
87-89: Fianna Fáil 
81-82: Fine Gael/Labour (8 months) 
97-02: Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrats 
Majority 77-81: Fianna Fáil 82-87: Fine Gael/Labour 
89-92: Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrats 
92-94: Fianna Fáil/ Labour 
94-97: Fine Gael/Labour/Democratic Left 
02-07: Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrats 
07-)LDQQD)iLO*UHHQV3URJUHVVLYH'HPRFUDWV 
1RWHThe 20017-11 coalition lost its majority when the Progressive Democrats disbanded in 2009, but 




 Table 2. Factors affecting fulfilment of governing SDUWLHV¶ pledges 
 Model 1: 
All government party 
pledges 
Model 2:  
Coalition party 
pledges 
 b (s.e.) p b (s.e.) p 
Government type  
Power sharing and agreement 
between governing parties 
(reference group: coalition 
parties, no agreement) 
    
Coalition (with consensus) .65 (.16) .00 .70 (.17) .00 
Single-SDUW\JRY¶W .33 (.12) .00 - - 
     
Majority government -.24 (.29) .39 .04 (.32) .90 
     
Position of party in coalition      
Prime ministership - .58 (.17) .00 
Relevant ministry - .13 (.16) .43 
     
Economic conditions and type of 
pledge 
    
Growth .08 (.04) .03 .09 (.04) .01 
Expansionary pledge .35 (.10) .00 .36 (.10) .00 
Growth × expansionary  pledge                 .04 (.03) .16 .03 (.03) .28 
Tax cut pledge -.41 (.29) .15 -.51 (.29) .07 
Growth × tax cut pledge .15 (.05) .00 .15 (.05) .00 
     
Short duration of government 
(1=less than 1 year; 0=longer) 
-1.56 (.40) .00 -1.51 (.28) .00 
     
Opposition support .63 (.18) .00 .61 (.20) .00 
     
Constant -.63 (.31) .04 -1.20 (.40) .00 
     
Chi2 (p) 314.77 (.00) 664.32 (.00) 
Log pseudolikelihood -1091.24 -986.09 
n 1783 1651 
Note: Logistic regression analysis; dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether a pledge is 





Table 3. Factors affecting fulfilment of opposition party pledges 
 b (s.e.) p 
Type of government faced   
Single-party  .27 (.21) .20 
Majority -.16 (.21) .44 
   
Economic conditions and type of pledge   
Growth .10 (.03) .00 
Expansionary pledge .03 (.16) .86 
Growth × expansionary .10 (.03) .00 
Tax cut pledge -.46 (.58) .43 
Growth × tax cut  .15 (.08) .06 
   
Short duration of government  
(1=less than 1 year; 0=longer) 
.10 (.36) .78 
   
Opposition support .30 (.15) .05 
Government support .84 (.14) .00 
   
Constant -1.25 (.28) .00 
   
Chi2 (p) 399.07 (.00) 
Log pseudolikelihood -1137.18 
n 1898 
Note: Logistic regression analysis; dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether a pledge is 
fulfilled/partially fulfilled (1) or not fulfilled (0).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
